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SECURITY INFORMATION

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

73

12 December 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: SE-20: The Probable Consequences of Certain Possible
US Courses of Action with Respect to Communist China
and Korea

1. The attached draft estimate, urgently required by the Senior NSC Staff, has been approved by the Board of National Estimates pursuant to a consideration of it by the IAC representatives.

2. This estimate has been placed on the agenda of the IAC meeting scheduled for 10:30 Friday, 14 December 1951.

3. The following TABS have been prepared, are currently before the Board, and will be circulated for coordination at a later date;

TAB "A" Analysis of Chinese Communist Trade
for 1951

TAB "B" Strategic Targets in Communist China

TAB "C" Communist China's Air Defense Capabilities

TAB "D" Chinese Nationalist Armed Forces

TAB "E" Estimate of the Present Strength and
Capabilities of Anti-Communist Guerrillas
in China

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SECURITY INFORMATION

53817-3

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

12 December 1951

SUBJECT: SE-20: THE PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF CERTAIN POSSIBLE
US COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO COMMUNIST
CHINA AND KOREA

THE PROBLEM

To estimate (a) the effect on Communist China of certain
possible US courses of action, and (b) the Communist reaction
to these courses of action.*

ESTIMATE

1. Expansion of the Korean War by Interdiction of Sea-Borne
Imports to Communist China.

a. An effective interdiction of Communist Chinese sea-
borne imports would require both: (1) an embargo on exports
and shipping to Communist China by all important non-Communist
trading and maritime countries; and (2) the imposition of a
full scale naval blockade of all Chinese Communist ports,
including Port Arthur and Dairen. It would be essential to

*

The question of whether the UN would support the US in
these courses of action is beyond the scope of this paper.

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